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THE AMBIGUITY OF KNOWABILITY
BARTELD KOOI
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen
Abstract. In this paper it is shown that the Verification Thesis (all truths are knowable) is only
susceptible to Fitch’s Paradox if one conflates the de re and de dicto interpretation of knowability.
A formalisation shows that if one treats knowability as a complex second-order predicate, then the
paradox falls apart.
§1. Introduction. Fitch’s paradox (1963) poses a serious challenge for the Verifica-
tion Thesis (VT) that all truths are knowable. If one assumes that there is an unknown
truth p, then p is an unknown truth is itself a truth. According to VT this implies that p is
an unknown truth is knowable, but this leads to a contradiction, because if p is an unknown
truth were known, then p would be both known and unknown. Therefore VT implies that
there are no unknown truths. This consequence of VT is clearly absurd, but it is unclear
how this absurdity can be avoided.
After its rediscovery in the 1970s, a great number of publications have discussed the
paradox and proposed ways to solve it. Brogaard and Salerno (2012) distinguish two
categories for approaches to the paradox: (i) those that avoid the absurdity by weakening
the logic that led to it, (ii) those that avoid the absurdity by restricting the quantifier in
such a way that VT does not apply to the so-called Moore sentence: p is an unknown
truth. In this paper I argue that there is a third way of approaching the paradox, namely by
maintaining that the paradox is based on a fallacy of equivocation. Sentences such as VT
containing the word ‘knowable’ can be read in two ways: they can be given a de re and
de dicto interpretation. I show that the de re interpretation of VT is not susceptable to the
argument above, while the de dicto interpretation of VT is susceptable to it. Therefore, a
verificationist can argue that the de re interpretation of VT is the right interpretation and in
doing so ward off the paradox.
The approach presented here is in the same spirit—though different from—approaches
that Brogaard and Salerno (2012) categorize under (ii), namely Kvanvig (1995; 2006)
who concludes that the truths over which VT quantifies are indexical due to implicit
quantifiers over individuals and times in VT, and Edgington (1985) who takes knowledge to
depend on a situation and takes VT to contain implicit quantifiers over situations. Recently,
Kennedy (2014) proposed a formal solution in the same spirit, that identifies the error in
the argument as a substitution of non-rigid expressions into modal contexts. My analysis
identifies the ambiguity of VT and the resulting equivocation as the source of the paradox,
and provides a simple formal setting, based on the work of Van Benthem (2004), to support
the analysis.
To be precise, my analysis locates the fallacious shift in interpretation when the argument
proceeds from
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(1) p is an unknown truth is knowable,
to
(2) It is possible that p is an unknown truth is known.
Sentence 1 is true in its de re interpretation, but sentence 2 only follows from the de
dicto interpretation of sentence 1. In other words, Moore sentences are knowable, while
simultaneously it is impossible for them to be known. I will provide a formal logic in
which this inference pattern is invalid.
§2. De re and de dicto. It is well known that ambiguity comes about when an expres-
sion may fall inside or outside the scope of a modality. In the context of first-order modal
logic, Stalnaker and Thomason (1968) provide the following example of a natural language
sentence, which has two different interpretations:
(3) The President of the U.S. is necessarily a citizen of the U.S.
This sentence can be read de re as:
(4) The President of the U.S. has the property of being necessarily a citizen of the U.S.
It can be read de dicto as:
(5) It is necessary that: the President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S.
Stalnaker and Thomason argue that the de re reading of the sentence is false given that
one can easily describe a possible world where the person who is the President of the U.S.
in the actual world, is not a U.S. citizen, whereas the de dicto reading is true (provided
that the modality ranges over possible worlds consistent with U.S. law). The ambiguity in
the original sentence depends on whether one interprets the singular term ‘the President of
the U.S.’ outside or inside the scope of the modality of necessity. Another way of putting
this point is to say that one can regard the modality as being part of the complex predicate
of ‘necessarily being a U.S. citizen’ that applies to the term ‘the President of the U.S.’
and hence de re (concerning the thing). Or one can regard the modality as applying to the
sentence ‘the President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S.’ an hence de dicto (concerning
what is said). Generally, the term de re applies to interpretations of an expression outside
the scope of a modality and de dicto applies to interpretations of an expression inside the
scope of a modality.
The history of the distinction between de re and de dicto interpretations can be traced
back to Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations where he treats fallacies of ambiguity and equiv-
ocation. When discussing fallacies arising from combination and division of words
(166a23-25), he uses the examples of ‘being able to walk while sitting’ and ‘being able
to write while not writing’ (see Hasper, 2009). Clearly, the ambiguity arises because the
scope of the modality can be read in two ways. The ambiguity of ‘being possibly known
while unknown’ is very similar.
The main difference between expressions such as ‘being able to walk’ and ‘being possi-
bly known’ is that the first applies to objects such as human beings and animals, whereas
the second applies to propositions. Consequently, the former can be rendered in some sort
of first-order modal logic, and the latter in second-order modal logic, where propositions
feature as terms to which second-order predicates apply. Propositions are usually not con-
sidered as terms, but there are many contexts in which we use terms to refer to propositions,
e.g., John 1:1, the Brouwer fixed point theorem, proposition 4.1 of the Tractatus, Article 5
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc. In such cases properties such as
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believed, proved, true, and known can be applied to such terms and thereby modalities
can be thought of as second-order predicates. The inference pattern underlying Fitch’s
paradox is not bound to second-order modal logic and can be interpreted in both first and
second-order modal logic:
(6)
t is a possible P.
Therefore it is possible that t is a P .
If we substitute ‘p is an unknown truth’ for t , and ‘known’ for P , then we find part of the
argument in Fitch’s paradox. One can easily construct counterexamples to the validity of
this pattern, when t is interpreted de re in the premiss, and de dicto in the conclusion:
t P
the person closest to the north pole writing person who is not writing
a letter
the President of the U.S. non-U.S. citizen
the winning lottery ticket of the next Mega nonwinning lottery ticket
Millions lottery
the largest country pope Francis will never place pope Francis will visit
visit
the last theorem proved by Fermat not proved by Fermat
The elements are invariably some contingent property of some class of entities and a
definite description of an entity within the relevant class that does not have the property by
its description.
§3. A formal language with second-order predicate abstraction. In order to give a
formal treatment of Fitch’s paradox we need a language with which we can syntactically
distinguish the de re and de dicto readings of VT. Besides the usual Boolean operators,
the language has three operators: one for expressing knowledge (K ), one for necessity
(), and one for second-order predicate abstraction (〈λp.·〉·). The operator for second-
order predicate abstraction is instrumental to distinguishing de re readings from de dicto
readings.
DEFINITION 3.1 (language). The language L is given by the following Backus–Naur Form:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kϕ | ϕ | 〈λp.ϕ〉ϕ,
where p ranges over the elements of some set P of atomic propositions. The sublanguage
of L without any necessity or abstraction operators is the language of epistemic logic and
denoted as L E L . We use (ϕ → ψ) as an abbreviation of ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ as an
abbrevation of ¬¬ϕ. Outer parentheses will often be omitted.
In first-order modal logic, one can syntactically distinguish de re from de dicto state-
ments using first-order predicate abstraction (Stalnaker and Thomason, 1968; Fitting and
Mendelsohn, 1998). Predicate abstraction allows one to treat complex predicates as a
distinct syntactic category. An expression of the form 〈λx .ϕ〉 behaves as a complex unary
predicate that can be applied to terms. In this expression x is a variable ranging over
individuals and ϕ a first-order modal formula with x occurring freely. This construction
is very much like lambda abstraction from lambda calculus, but rather than yielding a
function, the result is a predicate, hence the name “predicate abstraction”. Let t be a
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are formal renditions of (4) and (5) above. Note that in (7), the term t occurs outside the
scope of  whereas in (8) t occurs inside the scope of .
Second-order predicate abstraction occurs in the work of Fitting (1998) and we have
included it in the language defined above. An expression of the form 〈λq.ϕ〉, where q is a
dummy propositional variable, is a second-order predicate that can be applied to formulas.
In the language of this logic one can express for instance that “Fermat’s last theorem is
known” by 〈λq.K q〉(t) where t is the theorem. In this way one can faithfully formalize
predicates such as ‘known’ as second-order predicates.
The formal rendition of VT in the literature is usually taken to be the following:
(9) ϕ → Kϕ
with implicit universal quantification over all sentences ϕ. Since the occurrence of ϕ in the
consequent of VT is inside the scope of , this formalization interprets the consequent of
VT as a de dicto statement. However, when one takes ‘knowable’ as a complex second-
order predicate 〈λq.K q〉, one would end up with a de re reading of VT:
(10) ϕ → 〈λq.K q〉(ϕ).
In contrast to (9), here the second occurrence of ϕ is outside the scope of .1 So, we now
have a language with which we can syntactically distinguish the de re reading from the de
dicto reading of VT. In natural language we could paraphrase these respectively as:
(11) If ϕ, then it is possible that ϕ is known.
(12) If ϕ, then ϕ has the property of being knowable.
It may seem implausible that these two sentences have different meanings. In the remainder
we show that we can distinguish the two corresponding formulas semantically.
§4. Semantics. A key element of a semantics for this language must be that the mean-
ing of a formula depends on whether it falls inside or outside the scope of the operator .
Otherwise de re and de dicto interpretations would merely differ syntactically. The proposal
of Van Benthem (2004, 2009) and subsequently Balbiani et al. (2008) fits the bill. Van
Benthem interprets  as a quantifier over truthful public announcements (a particular kind
of information changing event where all agents receive the same true information and it
is common knowledge among them that this is so (Plaza, 1989)). One of the features of
public announcements is that they may change the extension of a formula, i.e., the set of
worlds where the formula ϕ holds may change due to an announcement. This may happen
because in Van Benthem’s approach the operator  corresponds to a relation between
models, rather than a relation between worlds. Hence the meaning of a formula depends on
its modal nesting.
1 This analysis of knowability is less radical than Fuhrmann (2014), who treats knowability as an
operator which cannot be defined in terms of possibility and knowledge. Although knowability is
syntactically a second-order predicate in my approach, it is still analyzed in terms of possibility
and knowledge.
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Van Benthem paraphrases (9) as: if ϕ is true, then there is a true ψ such that ϕ becomes
known after announcing ψ . The implication is taken to be a classical material implication
and K is taken to be a normal epistemic modality that distributes over conjunction (if a
conjunction is known, then so are its conjuncts) and satisfies at least the axiom T (all
knowns are true: Kϕ → ϕ). Yet, in his approach to Fitch’s paradox, the formal rendition
of VT is also (9), and hence a de dicto interpretation of VT. In the logic proposed by Van
Benthem, the paradoxical argument goes through and so he concludes that VT cannot be
saved. We will see that the de re interpretation of VT with the same interpretation for K
and  as Van Benthem is consistent.
Simple Kripke models for epistemic logic will be used to interpret the language. We
will not consider multiple agents, but just one single knower, and so we can do without
an accessibility relation and simply consider the set of all possible worlds to consist of the
knower’s epistemic alternatives.2
DEFINITION 4.1 (models). Given a set of atoms P, a model M is a triple (W, V, w), where
• W = ∅ is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
• V : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation that assigns a set of possible worlds to each atom,
• w ∈ W is a world taken to be the actual world.
We can interpret the language introduced in the previous section in these models.
DEFINITION 4.2 (semantics). We define |
 as a relation between models and formulas of
L recursively as follows. Let a model M = (W, V, w) be given.
M |
 p iff w ∈ V (p)
M |
 ¬ϕ iff M |
 ϕ
M |
 (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff M |
 ϕ and M |
 ψ
M |
 Kϕ iff (W, V, w′) |
 ϕ for all w′ ∈ W
M |
 ϕ iff Mψ |
 ϕ for all ψ ∈ L E L such that M |
 ψ
M |
 〈λp.ϕ〉ψ iff Mp:=ψ |
 ϕ
In the clause for ϕ, the model Mψ = (Wψ, Vψ,w) is such that
• Wψ = {w′ ∈ W | (W, V, w′) |
 ψ},
• Vψ(p) = V (p) ∩ W ψ .
In the clause for 〈λp.ϕ〉ψ , the model Mp:=ψ = (W, V p:=ψ,w) is such that
• Vp:=ψ(q) =
{ {w′ ∈ W | (W, V, w′) |
 ψ} if q = p
V (q) otherwise .
So, a formula of the form ϕ quantifies over models with a (possibly) smaller set of
possible worlds (and hence more knowledge). The formula 〈λp.ϕ〉ψ is a statement about a
model with a different valuation (and hence formulas may have a different extension).
§5. A formal analysis of the paradox. The de dicto formalization of VT indeed
implies that all truths are known. The proof of the following theorem is just Fitch’s paradox
in a more formal setting.
2 As it turns out, the analysis does not rely on this simplification. All one needs to assume is
that the accessibility relation is reflexive. For the sake of elegance and clarity we have kept the
presentation as simple as possible.
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THEOREM 5.1. For every model M, if for all formulas ϕ ∈ L it holds that M |
 ϕ →
Kϕ, then for all formulas ψ ∈ L it holds that M |
 ψ → Kψ .
Proof. Take an arbitrary model M and suppose that for all ϕ ∈ L it holds that M |

ϕ → Kϕ. Take an arbitrary formula ψ ∈ L and suppose that M |
 ψ Suppose that
M |
 Kψ . Then M |
 ψ ∧ ¬Kψ . Therefore by the assumption above it follows that
M |
 K (ψ ∧ ¬Kψ). There is no model that satisfies K (ψ ∧ ¬Kψ). This formula is
equivalent to Kψ ∧ K¬Kψ). The left conjunct implies that ψ is true at all worlds, but the
right conjunct implies that ψ is false at some world. Therefore there is also no submodel
of M that satisfies this formula. Hence M |
 K (ψ ∧ ¬Kψ). Therefore M |
 Kψ and
so M |
 ψ → Kψ . 
It turns out that the de re formalization of VT is a tautology in this logic. This is somewhat
surprising, because one might expect it to be merely consistent.3
THEOREM 5.2. For every ϕ ∈ L, the formula ϕ → 〈λq.K q〉ϕ is a tautology.
Proof. Take an arbitrary formula ϕ and a model M0 and suppose that M0 |
 ϕ. We now
have to show that M0 |
 〈λq.K q〉(ϕ). Take the model M1 = M0q:=ϕ . By the semantics
of predicate abstraction, we have to show that M1 |
 K q. Therefore, we have to find
an appropriate formula ψ ∈ L E L such that M1 |
 ψ and M1ψ |
 K q. We take this
formula to be q. Note that q ∈ L E L and M1 |
 q, because M0 |
 ϕ. Now consider the
model M2 = M1q . Note that W 2 = {w′ | (W 1, V 1, w′) |
 q}. Therefore (W 2, V 2, w′′) |

q for all w′′ ∈ W 2. By the semantics of K it is now clear that M2 |
 K q. Therefore
M0 |
 〈λq.K q〉(ϕ). Since M0 was arbitrary, it follows that ϕ → 〈λq.K q〉(ϕ) is a
tautology. 
Since this theorem holds for all formulas it should also hold for the Moore formula
p ∧ ¬K p, stating that p is an unknown truth. This formula is indeed consistent and we
can provide a model in which p ∧ ¬K p is true. The simplest model would be M0 =
(W, V, w), where W = {w,w′} and V (p) = {w}. In order to evaluate the formula that
states that p ∧ ¬K p is knowable, we also need a dummy propositional variable q where
V (q) can be any subset of W . Let us see how the argument continues using this model
and evaluate the formula 〈λq.K q〉(p ∧ ¬K p)), which states that p ∧ ¬K p is knowable.
The formula p ∧ ¬K p is true at (W, V, w), but false at (W, V, w′). Now when we move
to M1 = M0q:=p∧¬K p , it will be the case that V 1(q) = {w1}. Updating this model with q
will result in model M2 = M1q where W 2 = {w} and V 2(q) = W 2. Hence M2 |
 K q. So
M0 |
 〈λq.K q〉(p ∧ ¬K p)), and so indeed the Moore formula p ∧ ¬K p is knowable,
even though, as we saw above, the formula K (p ∧ ¬K p), which states that p ∧ ¬K p is
known, is a contradiction.
As far as the paradox goes, this analysis suggests that when we interpret VT as a de dicto
statement, the paradox’s argument is valid, and the conclusion that all truths are known
follows. However, the premise VT is not acceptable. When we interpret VT as a de re
statement, then it is certainly acceptable, but then the argument is not valid, and accepting
VT would not force one to accept that all truths are known.
In particular, the inference where one concludes that p is an unknown truth is de dicto
possibly known from p is an unknown truth being de re knowable is invalid in this logic.
3 One can adapt the logic such that it is merely consistent and not a tautology, but this would
unnecessarily complicate the presentation here.
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Formally:
(13)
〈λq.K q〉(p ∧ ¬K p)
〈λq.K q〉(p ∧ ¬K p)
is invalid. Yet, because of the equivocation of de re knowability and de dicto possible
knowledge it may seem an unexceptional step in the argument.
§6. Conclusion. An adherent of VT will likely say that knowable should now obvi-
ously be taken as a complex second-order predicate, and the analysis shows that she can
argue that this position does not entail that all truths are known. Regarding some unknown
truth p (say, the twin prime conjecture), she can maintain that the twin prime conjecture
is an unknown truth is knowable if true, whereas it is not possible that the twin prime
conjecture is an unknown truth is known. This is completely analogous to maintaining that
the President of the U.S. is a possible non-U.S. citizen, whereas it is not possible that the
President of the U.S. is not a U.S. citizen.
By regarding knowledge as a propositional attitude and propositions as sets of possible
worlds, we can take the de re reading of VT to say that an agent can take on the attitude of
knowledge towards any set of possible worlds containing the actual world, provided that
this set is the extension of some sentence.4 If ‘the twin prime conjecture is an unknown
truth’ expresses a proposition and this proposition is some set of possible worlds t , such that
the actual world is in it, then VT states that some truthful announcement can be made, such
that this announcement will exclude all possible worlds which fall outside t . Therefore t
becomes known, yet the sentence ‘the twin prime conjecture is an unknown truth’ now
expresses some other proposition different from t . Analogously, in a possible world where
Obama is not a U.S. citizen, the President of the U.S. will describe someone else. In this
way the paradox is kept at bay.
One may object that the position of the adherent of VT is closely tied to Van Benthem’s
reading of the diamond. But one can even see a similar pattern in Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem implies that there is a sentence in the language of
first-order arithmetic which is true when this language is interpreted over the natural num-
bers, but which is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic (PA). Gödel provides such a sentence G
which states that G is unprovable in PA. G is therefore very much like an unknowable
truth. One can add G to PA, thereby obtaining a new formal system PA + G in which G
is provable (see Smith, 2007, p. 149). Yet in that system G does not state that G is not
provable in PA + G, just as ‘the twin prime conjecture is an unknown truth’ will no longer
state an unknown truth once we learn that the twin prime conjecture is true.
§7. Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Johan van Benthem, Hans van
Ditmarsch, Igor Douven, Matthew Duncombe, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Emar Maier,
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4 This provision is crucial. There may be sets of worlds that include the actual world which are not
the extension of a sentence. Such sets can be unknowable in the sense that an agent may be unable
to take on the attitude of knowledge towards such a set by any means. However, such sets are not
truths in a linguistic sense. This suggests that, in line with verificationism, VT is best understood
as a statement about truths expressible in language.
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755020315000416
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Groningen, on 02 Nov 2016 at 13:17:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
428 BARTELD KOOI
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Balbiani, P., Baltag, A., van Ditmarsch, H., Herzig, A., Hoshi, T., & de Lima, T.
(2008). ‘Knowable’ as ‘known after an announcement’. Review of Symbolic Logic, 1(3),
205–334.
Brogaard, B. & Salerno, J. (2012). Fitch’s paradox of knowability. In Zalta, E. N.
editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 ed.), Available from:
http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=fitch-paradox.
Edgington, D. (1985). The paradox of knowability. Mind, 94(376), 557–568.
Fitch, F. B. (1963). A logical analysis of some value concepts. The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 28(2), 135–142.
Fitting, M. (1998). Higher-order modal logic — a sketch. In Automated Deduction in
Classical and Non-Classical Logics, LNAI, Vol. 1761. Berlin: Springer, pp. 23–28.
Fitting, M. & Mendelsohn, R. (1998). First-order Modal Logic. Berlin: Springer.
Fuhrmann, A. (2014). Knowability as potential knowledge. Synthese, 191(7), 1627–1648.
Hasper, P. S. (2009). Logic and linguistics: Aristotle’s account of the fallacies of
combination and division in the Sophistical Refutations. Apeiron, 42(2), 195–152.
Kennedy, N. (2014). Defending the possibility of knowledge. Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 43(2,3), 579–601.
Kvanvig, J. (1995). The knowability paradox and the prospects for anti-realism. Noûs,
29(4), 481–500.
Kvanvig, J. (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plaza, J. (1989). Logics of public communications. In Emrich, M. L., Pfeifer, M. S.,
Hadzikadic, M., and Ras, Z. W. editors. Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium
on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems (ISMIS 1989): Poster Session Program.
Charlotte: Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORNL/DSRD-24, pp. 201–216.
Smith, P. (2007). An Introduction to Gödel’s Theorems. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Stalnaker, R. C. & Thomason, R. H. (1968). Abstraction in first-order modal logic. Theoria,
34, 203–207.
Thomason, R. H. & Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). Modality and reference. Noûs, 2(4), 359–372.
van Benthem, J. (2004). What one may come to know. Analysis, 64(2), 95–105.
van Benthem, J. (2009). Actions that make us know. In Salerno, J. editor. New Essays on








Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Groningen, on 02 Nov 2016 at 13:17:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
